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Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of
Corporate Sustainability Reporting
GALIT A. SARFATY*

Over the past two decades, there has been a drive to reduce complex concepts
into simple numbers. Corruption, rule of law, human rights, and more have all
been reduced to quantitative indicators. The appeal of indicators lies in their
ability to translate social phenomena into a numerical representation that is
transparent, easy to understand, and comparable across actors. Under the theory
that what gets measured gets done, international law has begun relying on these
tools to operationalize global norms and assess compliance. In particular,
private regulatory bodies are using indicators to seek legitimacy and claim
scientific authority as they set global standards and shape domestic law. Yet
legal scholarship has been largely silent about the implications of these statistical
tools for governance.
In this Article, I analyze the prevalence of quantitative indicators as an
emerging regulatory tool in domestic and global governance, identify the potential
costs of using these tools to inform decision making, and offer recommendations
on how to limit their costs and enhance their benefits. My analysis draws from
an empirical study of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), based on personal
interviews and participation in a GRI-certified training program. The GRI is a
private transnational body that has produced the leading standard for
sustainability reporting, used by more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune
250 companies. Its guidelines include 79 indicators for corporations to report on
their social, environmental, and economic performance.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. A.B., Harvard College,
2000; J.D., Yale Law School, 2005; Ph.D., Anthropology, University of Chicago, 2011. I am grateful
to Rachel Brewster, Cary Coglianese, Kevin Davis, Oona Hathaway, Bill Laufer, Sally Engle Merry,
Ariel Meyerstein, Nien-hê Hsieh, Benedict Kingsbury, Eric Orts, Adam Saunders, Amy Sepinwall,
Richard Shell, David Wilkins, and David Zaring. This Article significantly benefited from my
participation as a research scholar in NYU School of Law’s project on indicators and global
governance and the 2012 Junior Faculty Forum at Harvard Law School.
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Based on this study, I identify three potential costs of using indicators in
regulation — specifically, the promotion of box ticking and superficial
compliance, the dominance of technical experts over decision making, and the
distortion of public values when converted to numbers. I then propose that
government agencies and private actors design meaningful indicators and
rankings that measure what is relevant to stakeholders, avoid data overload,
require third-party verification, and expand participation by citizens and a
broad group of experts.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, there has been a drive to reduce
complicated concepts into simple numbers. Corruption, rule of law,
human rights, and more, have all been reduced to quantitative
“indicators.” Based on the theory that what gets measured gets done,
government agencies have incorporated quantitative indicators into
performance-based rules, information disclosure regimes, and self-
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regulation.1 International law has recently begun using these statistical
tools to operationalize global norms and thereby improve compliance.
As a second-order abstraction of statistical information, indicators rely
on numbers to represent social phenomena and evaluate performance.
Backed by technical expertise and designed to produce comparability,
these tools are shaping decision making by domestic and global regulatory
bodies. For instance, the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators produce
a ranking of developing countries based on the quality of their business
laws and legal institutions.2 The Bank’s classification then influences its
allocation of foreign aid as well as that of the U.S. government through the
Millennium Challenge Corporation.3 Domestic law has also incorporated
indicators, as in the 2008 reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act.4 This law relies on performance indicators to assess
foreign governments’ compliance with minimum anti-trafficking standards
and then categorize countries into three tiers.5 Given their propensity to
simplify complex concepts and translate them into quantifiable measures,
indicators are often used to regulate more intangible, value-laden issues
such as the rule of law (as in the Freedom House indicators), corruption
(as in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index), and
human rights (as in the indicators developed by the Office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor treaty compliance).6
Indicators are playing an increasingly important role in regulatory
governance.7 If used effectively, they can offer a number of apparent
benefits: they can measure accountability to standards and norms; assess
1. See, e.g., Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, The Politics of Regulation: From Institutionalism to
New Governance, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 107 (2011); Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman, Fighting
Childhood Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 DUKE L. J. 101 (2007); Cass
R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613
(1999).
2. See World Bank, Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size
Enterpries (2012).
3. Id.; MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS AND THE
SELECTION PROCESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2012).
4. Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 &
42 U.S.C.).
5. Id.
6. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (2010), available at,
http://tinyurl.com/lkjquza; TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER (2009);
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Indicators for Promoting and
Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2008/3 (June 6, 2008).
7. Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Indicators as a Technology of Global
Governance, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 71 (2012). This paper as well as my article are part of a larger
research project on indicators and global governance based at NYU School of Law and sponsored by
the National Science Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The project features a
network of scholars from several countries and has organized a series of conferences to develop a
research agenda on this topic. See Indicators Project, INST. FOR INT’L L. & JUST.,
http://tinyurl.com/ln3um85 (last visited July 24, 2013).
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compliance with policies and specific targets; and evaluate performance
with respect to stated objectives. They can also facilitate an efficient
processing of information and reduce the costs and resources devoted to
decision making. The appeal of indicators lies in their ability to translate
phenomena, such as respect for the rule of law, into a numerical
representation that is easy to understand and compare across actors.
Moreover, their simplicity enables more effective communication with
those who are governed as well as the general public, thereby promoting
ideals of transparency and accountability (at least in theory). Yet legal
scholarship has been largely silent about the implications of indicators for
governance. While scholars have recognized the benefits of new
governance mechanisms,8 they have neglected to consider the limitations
when these statistical tools are applied in practice. I contend that indicators
are being embraced too wholeheartedly without sufficient attention to
their costs.
In this Article, I analyze the prevalence of quantitative indicators as an
emerging regulatory tool in domestic and global governance, identify the
potential costs of using these tools to inform decision making, and offer
recommendations on how to limit their costs and enhance their benefits.
My primary aim is not to reject the use of indicators in governance. Rather,
I propose ways in which government agencies and private actors can more
effectively use these tools in regulation to meaningfully compare units of
analysis and evaluate performance. I argue that indicators can serve as
effective tools provided that they measure what is relevant to stakeholders,
are designed by a broad group of experts and citizens, and are backed by
reliable data. This Article contributes to scholarly debates on the
effectiveness of new governance mechanisms in regulation as well as the
legitimacy of private regulatory bodies, which have become key players in
international governance.9
8. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,
115 YALE L. J. 1490, 1534 (2006) (“Institutions involved in international decisionmaking should be
required to develop indicators and metrics that track issues of concern, and to collect data on a basis
that is comparable across jurisdictions. A data-driven policy evaluation structure that gauges
institutional performance can trigger competitive pressures and support a more empirical approach
to decisionmaking, thereby contributing to policymaking effectiveness.”).
9. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000);
BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND
THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY (2004); NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM LAW-TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS (Math Noortmann & Cedric
Ryngaert eds. 2010); MYRIAM SENN, NON-STATE REGULATORY REGIMES: UNDERSTANDING
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION (2011); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
(2004); Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle: Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global
Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (2005) (reviewing Anne-Marie Slaughter’s book);
Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543 (2000); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 262 (2004); Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global Private
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Indicators address a visceral desire of policymakers to find mechanisms
that can increase compliance with rules, a problem particularly acute in
international law. Given its lack of coercive force, international law must
rely on other means to affect state and non-state behavior. Scholars have
studied the role of reputation, reciprocity, and acculturation, among other
factors, in enhancing international law’s ability to shape policy and decision
making.10 An emerging but as yet under-studied mechanism is the power
of numbers.
Private regulatory bodies have emerged as significant players in the
production and enforcement of international law.11 However, the
legitimacy of private actors is questionable given their lack of public
accountability, an absence of oversight mechanisms, and possible
manipulation by special interests.12 Private regulatory bodies have recently
turned to indicators to claim scientific authority, affirm legal values such as
transparency and predictability, and assert their legitimacy to govern. Yet
when indicators translate legal norms into quantifiable metrics, there are
unintended consequences.
My analysis of indicators is based on an empirical study of the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI), a private regulatory body that has produced the
leading standard for corporate sustainability reporting. The GRI guidelines
include seventy-nine indicators on which corporations self-report on their
social, environmental, and economic performance and are then assigned a
score of A, B, or C.13 According to a 2008 study by the accounting firm
KPMG, more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune 250 companies
use GRI guidelines as the basis for their reporting.14 An increasing number
of countries (including France, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden) have
Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
225 (2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global
Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007).
10. See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY (2010); Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265
(2006); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated
Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation:
The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1573 (2011); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice,
105 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2007).
12. See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts Review of Transnational Private
Regulation, (Tel Aviv Univ. Law Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 125) available at
http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/art125/; Esty, supra note 8.
13. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES (2011),
available at http://tinyurl.com/88jjve9.
14. KPMG INT’L, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
REPORTING (2008).
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recently mandated sustainability disclosure by companies (some of which
rely on GRI guidelines), while many others are actively considering such a
regime and have already adopted voluntary sustainability reporting
standards.15 In addition, mainstream institutional investors, not just socially
responsible ones, are increasingly considering sustainability performance in
their investment decisions and thus consulting GRI reports.
As the case of the GRI illustrates, indicators facilitate the process by
which legal norms are interpreted and implemented, particularly in areas of
international law where norms may be ill defined and traditional
enforcement mechanisms are absent. For instance, the GRI indicators aim
to make corporate sustainability reporting more mainstream as part of a
larger goal of achieving corporate accountability. In this way, they are
operationalizing emerging norms on corporate responsibility for human
rights, among other issues. Soft law instruments such as the U.N. Global
Compact lack independent monitoring and enforcement and have been
criticized for being conceptually vague and difficult to implement.16 While
advocates have turned to U.S. litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited its exterritorial application.17 The
GRI is an example of an alternative approach — information regulation
through numbers — for changing corporate behavior.18 It represents a
shift in governance towards data-based tools such as quantitative
indicators to enhance compliance with legal norms.
Yet my study of the GRI demonstrates that the use of quantitative
indicators can be fraught with problems, which are often overlooked due
15. KPMG INT’L ET AL., CARROTS AND STICKS: PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND
SUSTAINABILITY (2010). Moreover, the European Commission hosted a series of six workshops
between September 2009 and February 2010 on the disclosure of ESG information by companies.
See Workshops on Disclosure, EUR. COMMISSION, http://tinyurl.com/ybca7ox (last updated May, 2
2013). The final workshop report suggested the possibility of using the GRI as a reference point in
future European policy. European Workshops on Disclosure of Environmental, Social and Governance
Information, Final Workshop, Summary of Discussions, p. 16 (Feb. 25, 2010).
16. Created in 2000, the UN Global Compact is a voluntary initiative to encourage companies to
embrace nine principles drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Labor Organization’s Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on
Environment and Development. See United Nations Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited July 24, 2013).
17. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroelum, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). The Alien Tort Claims Act
allows U.S. district courts to hear “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
18. Information regulation has become prevalent in the field of environmental law. See, e.g., David
W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76
U. COLO. L. REV. 379 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 115 (2004); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks,
18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Douglas A. Kysar &
James Salzman, Foreword: Making Sense of Information for Environmental Protection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1347
(2008).
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to the authoritative quality of numbers. For instance, one potential cost of
indicators is the promotion of box ticking and superficial compliance, as
evident in the GRI’s system of grading reports. Companies that issue GRI
reports receive a grade of A, B, or C based on the quantity of indicators
that they report on, rather than the quality of their performance.19 In
addition, because third-party verification is optional, NGOs do not trust
the data behind the indicators. We therefore see that the motivation
behind the GRI is not whether the reports are credible to NGOs or
whether they reflect a company’s good or bad performance, but that more
and more companies participate which perpetuates the existence of the
GRI and raises its status as the leading standard for corporate sustainability
reporting. In this way, the GRI has strayed from its original audience of
consumers and NGOs, and its initial aim of corporate accountability. The
use of indicators as ends, in and of themselves, has threatened the
perceived legitimacy of the organization that produces and relies on them.
My analysis of the GRI applies an anthropological approach as I look
inside the black box of indicators and analyze the various stages in which
they are implicated in governance, including their production,
implementation, and impact. Towards that end, I have conducted
interviews with the producers of the indicators (members of the GRI’s
secretariat in Amsterdam and its New York City office), users (company
officials that use GRI guidelines in their sustainability reports), consumers
(investors and NGOs who read GRI reports), and U.S. government
representatives (SEC officials who are considering whether to mandate
disclosure on environmental and social issues as part of securities filings).
In addition, I have participated in a GRI-certified training program in
order to look behind the numbers and understand how GRI reports are
made and evaluated.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I analyzes the prevalence of
indicators as a tool of domestic and international governance and then
explores the broader historical and sociological context that explains their
emergence in policymaking. Part II describes the development of the GRI
as the leading standard for corporate sustainability reporting and its impact
on regulation and financial markets. Part III draws upon the case study to
outline the potential costs of using indicators, including the promotion of
superficial compliance, the dominance of technical experts over decision
making, and the distortion of public values when converted to numbers.
Finally, Part IV offers recommendations on how to enhance the promise
and minimize the perils of using indicators. In order to maximize their
effectiveness, I propose that government agencies and private actors
19. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI APPLICATION LEVELS (2011), available at
http://tinyurl.com/ny9gtek.
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design meaningful indicators and rankings that measure what is relevant to
stakeholders, avoid data overload, require third-party verification, and
expand participation by citizens and a broad group of experts.

I.

INDICATORS AS A TOOL OF REGULATORY GOVERNANCE

A regulatory tool that has become increasingly prevalent in domestic
and international governance is the indicator, defined as follows:
An indicator is a named, rank-ordered representation of past or
projected performance by different units that uses numerical data
to simplify a more complex social phenomenon, drawing on
scientific expertise and methodology. The representation is capable
of being used to compare particular units of analysis (such as
countries or persons), and to evaluate their performance by
reference to one or more standards.20
Comprising such aggregators as indices, rankings, and composites,
indicators serve as second-order abstractions of statistical information and
are used to evaluate performance according to a standard.21
Indicators attempt to imbue a technocratic rationality into decision
making and, by doing so, render domains (however complex, such as
health or criminality) calculable and susceptible to evaluation and
intervention. A guise of neutrality and objectivity exists behind these tools
and masks underlying power relations. Their effectiveness depends on
experts with specialized skills and esoteric knowledge — “[e]xperts hold
out the hope that problems of regulation can remove themselves from the
disputed terrain of politics and relocate onto the tranquil yet seductive
territory of truth.”22 Given their ability to translate phenomena into a
numerical representation that is transparent, easy to understand, and
comparable across actors, indicators are increasingly incorporated in
domestic regulation and international law.

A.

The Prevalence of Indicators in Domestic Regulation

Domestic agencies frequently incorporate indicators into “new
governance” mechanisms, which comprise alternative regulatory strategies
that impact the behavior of business and other organizations.23 These
approaches include performance-based rules, information disclosure
20. Davis et al., supra note 7, at 2.
21. Id.
22. PETER MILLER & NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE PRESENT: ADMINISTERING
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE 69 (2008).
23. Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1. See also THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO
THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2001).
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regimes, voluntary programs, and self-regulation, all of which offer
regulated entities more flexibility than traditional regimes.24 New
governance mechanisms stand in contrast to command and control
methods that rely on specific, inflexible mandates to change behavior.
These methods are not mutually exclusive, for instance a voluntary
program could feature a performance-based standard or a self-regulatory
regime could be based on information disclosure rules.
Rather than specifying a certain behavior, performance-based regulation
sets measurable outcomes and often entails the application of performance
indicators. It provides regulated entities with the flexibility to develop
innovative, cost-effective methods to achieve a performance standard.25
Recent administrations have promoted the use of performance goals in
designing regulations. For example, former President Clinton’s Executive
Order No. 12866 directs agencies “to the extent feasible, [to] specify
performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of
compliance that regulated entities must adopt.”26 President Obama
reaffirmed this principle in a 2011 Executive Order and further called for
“evidence-based regulation.”27 A variety of performance-based
governmental initiatives incorporate indicators. A prominent example is
the No Child Left Behind Act, signed into law in January 2002.28 This
federal legislation requires schools to achieve specified academic results as
measured by a variety of indicators — for example, the percentage of
students who are at or above the proficient levels in reading and math; the
percentage of classes being taught by “highly qualified” teachers; and the
percentage of students who drop out of school.29 Another example is the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Reactor Oversight Process, which relies
on a series of performance indicators to monitor the safety of commercial
nuclear power reactors.30
Like performance-based regulation, informational regulation does not
mandate specific behavioral change; it instead requires actors to collect and
disclose information which is often based on indicators.31 Information
disclosure requirements feature prominently in regulation on such areas as
24. See Lobel, supra note 9.
25. See Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1, at 114; Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based
Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705
(2003); Sugarman & Sandman, supra note 1.
26. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(8), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
27. Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1(b)(4), 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011); The Regulatory Plan,
75 Fed. Reg. 79,455 (Dec. 20, 2010).
28. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended
primarily in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
29. Id.
30. See US NRC Reactor Oversight Process, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://tinyurl.com/kqm372w (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
31. See sources cited supra note 18.
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corporate financial reporting, environmental protection, auto safety, and
campaign finance. For instance, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory requires periodic disclosure of
industrial release of toxic chemicals as an indicator of a firm’s
environmental performance.32 This form of regulation can serve a variety
of purposes: “provid[ing] information to the public to correct for
information asymmetries,” “promot[ing] more informed consent or
deliberation,” and “chang[ing] the behavior of the firm by making
managers more aware of and concerned about their organization’s social
outputs.”33
Finally, there are voluntary government programs and self-regulation
efforts by business, which rely on incentives and social pressure to bring
about behavioral change. Voluntary government programs reward
participants “by offering educational resources, financial assistance, awards
and certifications, and exemptions from more formal requirements.”34
One such program that is also performance-based is the EPA’s National
Environmental Performance Track, which operated from 2000 through
2009.35 This initiative provided regulatory and administrative benefits (e.g.,
reduced inspections) to firms that achieved superior levels of
environmental performance.36 It also worked with participating firms to
improve performance based on a variety of environmental indicators,
including water use, greenhouse gas emissions, and hazardous waste
generation.37
Industry groups, non-governmental organizations, and standards-setting
bodies administer and enforce initiatives of self-regulation, which depend
on the cooperation of firms for their compliance.38 While these efforts are
sometimes largely symbolic and an attempt to avert more stringent
government action,39 they can potentially leverage market or activist
pressure to bring about desired behavior. There are also instances where
32. What Is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program?, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://tinyurl.com/m23ym3r (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J.
257 (2001).
33. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management To
Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 695 (2003).
34. Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1, at 116.
35. See National Environmental Performance Track, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
36. Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1, at 117.
37. Id.
38. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 9; VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE
FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001);
CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND
DEMOCRACY (2002).
39. See Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 LAW
& POL’Y 529, 531 (1997) (describing common fears of those who oppose self-regulation).
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self-regulation has transitioned into formal regulation.40 When used as part
of corporate self-regulation, indicators can serve as useful diagnostic tools
that facilitate problem solving and strategy development. They gauge the
magnitude and scope of a problem and measure progress over time toward
clearly defined goals. For example, the chemical industry’s Responsible
Care Program prescribes voluntary codes of practice for participating
companies to improve their environmental, health, and safety
performance.41 Launched in 1985 by the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers
Association, the program requires companies to measure progress using
performance indicators, such as energy consumption and number of
fatalities.42 By motivating actors to set priorities, design strategies, and
assess their behavior, indicators (such as those used in the Responsible
Care Program) can help firms manage their resources in order to achieve
improvements in performance.

B.

Indicators in International Law

The innovative regulatory practices described above are beginning to
appear in the international system, thus creating a model of “transnational
new governance.”43 Indicators are increasingly becoming a prominent
feature in global governance, as they operationalize legal principles and
provide a mechanism to measure compliance (frequently as part of a
ranking of states or firms). A variety of actors are relying on indicators for
the implementation of international law. First, UN treaty bodies and the
U.S. State Department are incorporating indicators into their compliance
assessments of international human rights standards. Second, indicators
are guiding the decision making of international organizations and
domestic aid agencies and thus indirectly shaping the laws of countries
seeking development assistance. Finally, private standard-setting
institutions are using indicators to evaluate and implement global norms as
they facilitate their incorporation into domestic law.
Indicators are playing an important role in the monitoring of
international legal norms and the imposition of sanctions on foreign
governments. For instance, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
40. See infra Part II.
41. See Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible
Care, 17 LAW & POL’Y 57, 59 (1995); Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation
Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 699–700
(2000).
42. American Chemistry Council, Responsible Care Performance Results, RESPONSIBLE CARE,
http://tinyurl.com/7zp65vz (last visited July 24, 2013).
43. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational
New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 541 (2009)
(developing a model for the new regulatory institutions that have emerged on the international
sphere).
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Human Rights has developed human rights indicators to assist treaty
bodies in their monitoring of major human rights conventions.44 The
treaty bodies can thereby more efficiently process state party reports and
monitor countries’ performance over time.45 On the domestic front, the
U.S. State Department uses indicators to evaluate and rank foreign
governments’ compliance with international standards of antitrafficking
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).46 On the basis of
the TVPA rankings, the United States imposes sanctions on countries that
are not making efforts to meet minimum standards.
Intergovernmental organizations like the World Bank are indirectly
shaping domestic law through country rankings that are based on
indicators. The World Bank’s Doing Business indicators classify countries
based on the quality of their business laws and legal institutions.47 These
indicators guide the allocation of development aid by not only the World
Bank but also the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United
States’s Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other multilateral
development banks. Countries are therefore motivated to reform their
laws in order to rank higher and garner more foreign aid.48 While the
World Bank produces its Doing Business indicators in-house, it also relies
on indicators produced by NGOs (e.g., those on corruption by
Transparency International and on human rights by Freedom House)
when determining eligibility for aid.49
Finally, private standard-setting organizations are relying on indicators
to interpret and implement global norms while also facilitating their
transition into domestic regulation. For instance, the GRI has developed
guidelines, including a set of seventy-nine indicators, to implement global
norms on corporate sustainability reporting.50 As a non-state actor, the
GRI cannot enforce compliance by requiring all companies to report on
their performance using its indicators. But it has influenced governments
and stock exchanges to model their standards for sustainability reporting
on its guidelines.51 Thus, the GRI guidelines are not only indirectly shaping
44. See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 6, at 10–15.
45. For a critique of this development, see AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The
Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 253, 281–85 (2009).
46. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 8, 18, 22 & 42 U.S.C.).
47. WORLD BANK, supra note 2.
48. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing
Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095, 1114 (2007); Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal
Reform, and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 51 (2009).
49. For example, see the methodology behind the World Bank’s governance indicators. World
Bank, WGI Data Sources, Governance & Anti-Corruption Resources 1996–2012, WORLDWIDE
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS PROJECT, http://tinyurl.com/ltjbzb3 (last visited July 24, 2013).
50. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 13.
51. See infra Part II.B.
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domestic law but are also themselves adopted as part of mandatory and
voluntary standards.
Transnational governance regimes frequently address collective action
problems (e.g., climate change) and coordination problems (e.g.,
harmonizing accounting standards) as they draw upon specialized
expertise.52 Private bodies, such as the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), the International Accounting Standards Board, and
the Fair Labor Association, bypass government involvement and
independently set standards on safety, accounting, and labor rights for
developing countries.53 While private bodies may replace direct
governmental regulation or regulate areas not subject to governmental
oversight, they raise important legitimacy concerns given their lack of
public accountability.54 On the legitimacy of supranational bodies, Daniel
Esty observes: “When a matter is largely scientific or technical, having
designated supranational experts address the problem may be
uncontroversial. As an issue becomes more political or normatively
charged, however, delegation to those lacking electoral legitimacy becomes
increasingly problematic.”55 Data exchange or policy benchmarking are
examples of activities with a scientific or technical focus that could
“establish the legitimacy of policymaking.”56 This is where indicators come
in.
Indicators are an important tool for private transnational institutions
that are vulnerable to criticisms of accountability and legitimacy. They
provide private actors with an easily accessible tool that allows them to
efficiently process information, attract public attention, and govern the
conduct of others. While non-state actors lack enforcement power, they
appeal to indicators to provide them with scientific authority and the
leverage to pressure actors to comply with their standards. By relying on
indicators, they can exert their power indirectly by “taking what is
essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political
discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science.”57 As a result,
their credibility is increased and their power is less subject to contestation.

52. See Mattli & Büthe, supra note 9, at 230.
53. For general information on these organizations and how they set their relevant standards, see
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html (last visited July 24,
2013), INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.ifrs.org (last visited July 24, 2013), and FAIR
LAB. ASS’N, http://www.fairlabor.org (last visited July 24, 2013).
54. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 12.
55. Esty, supra note 8, at 1511–12.
56. Id. at 1513.
57. HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM
AND HERMENEUTICS 196 (1982).
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The Sociological and Historical Factors Behind the Power of Numbers

In order to command scientific authority, indicators rely on numbers, as
they serve as second-order abstractions of complex phenomena. Numbers
construct new categories and new relations among people and things
through standardization and commensurability and, in the process,
“profoundly transform what we choose to do, who we try to be, and what
we think of ourselves.”58 Commensuration fosters detachment by
objectifying subjective values, standardizing relations between often
disparate characteristics, and enabling a depersonalization that is critical for
bureaucratic and economic rationality.59 This process “changes the terms
of what can be talked about, how we value, and how we treat what we
value.”60
Commensuration (through such tools as indicators) is a means of
managing uncertainty, depersonalizing relations, imposing control,
securing legitimacy, and enforcing discipline.61 Numbers serve as a
“technology of distance,”62 whose authority comes from “their capacity to
create and overcome distance, both physical and social.”63 They abstract
away the individual and the local while also creating a universal language
that transcends distance.64 In this way, objectivity through numbers
becomes a proxy for truth and fairness. In her study of human rights
indicators, Sally Engle Merry contends that indicators “convey an aura of
objective truth and facilitate comparisons. However, indicators typically
conceal their political and theoretical origins and underlying theories of
social change and activism.”65 Merry further notes that “[a] key dimension
of the power of indicators [and other technologies of audit] is their
capacity to convert complicated, contextually variable phenomena into
unambiguous, clear, and impersonal measures.”66 Numbers display
governmentality because they serve as a technology of power that
constitutes populations and makes individuals calculable and therefore
governable — both by others and themselves. They create “a promise of
control” through the administration of everyday life — for instance, they
58. IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 3 (1990).
59. See GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (1978).
60. Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell L. Stevens, Commensuration as a Social Process, 24 ANN.
REV. SOC. 313, 315 (1998).
61. See id. at 316.
62. THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE
AND PUBLIC LIFE ix (1995).
63. Wendy Espeland, Authority by the Numbers: Porter on Quantification, Discretion, and the Legitimation
of Expertise, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1107, 1107 (1997).
64. PORTER, supra note 62, at 77.
65. Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83, S84 (2011).
66. Id.
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reassure citizens “against the uncertainties of poverty, crime,
unemployment, and more recently environmental and technological
risk.”67
Why have officials and the public at large come to appreciate and even
demand numbers to solve problems, make decisions, and exert control?
Quantification methods have achieved considerable prestige and power in
the modern world.68 We see the prevalence of cost-benefit analysis in U.S.
government bureaucracies since the early-twentieth century as well as
within economics since the mid-twentieth century. State bureaucrats
introduced cost-benefit methods and other accounting technologies to
achieve uniformity and public trust, and to dispel the notion that their
decisions were arbitrary and biased given that they lacked the mandate of a
popular election.69 The notion of statistics as the science of the state
suggests how the accumulation and tabulation of facts (e.g., through
censuses, tax returns, and crime figures) transforms reality and the
qualitative world into a calculable form (i.e., what Ian Hacking calls “the
taming of chance”), and thus makes it susceptible to evaluation and
intervention.70
The emergence of indicators as techniques of governance is part of the
broader prevalence of economic expertise within the world of
bureaucracies as well as in domestic and international public policymaking.
Economic knowledge has diffused across national bureaucracies in many
countries throughout the twentieth century.71 Marion Fourcade argues that
“[e]conomics has become central to the nation . . . because the nation has
become more economic.”72 The globalization of economics and the
economic profession is related to the global circulation of capital (e.g.,
through public aid and foreign direct investment) and the resulting
economic interdependence of nations.73 The globalization of the law has
also created opportunities for economists to enter legal arenas
worldwide.74 As Fourcade demonstrates, there has been a “transformation
of economic knowledge into a technology of political and bureaucratic

67. SHEILA JASANOFF, STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER 33 (2004).
68. See PORTER, supra note 62, at viii.
69. See PORTER, supra note 62, at 8.
70. See HACKING, supra note 58; PETER MILLER & NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE PRESENT:
ADMINISTERING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL LIFE (2008).
71. See Marion Fourcade, The Construction of a Global Profession: The Transnationalization of Economics,
112 AM. J. SOC. 145, 161–68 (2006).
72. Id. at 167.
73. Id. at 150.
74. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 170
(2002).
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power,” including a global diffusion of the neoclassical paradigm for
economies, independent of local or historical context.75
Economists, statisticians, and accountants are playing a central role in
the data collection and information processing required for developing and
applying indicators. They decide what should be counted, the methods of
collecting data, and how that data should then be interpreted and
aggregated. When indicators are used as a regulatory tool and become
incorporated into law, these experts exert a significant influence over
political decision making, as I will demonstrate in the case of the GRI.

II.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE AS
THE LEADING STANDARD FOR CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING

The field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a fertile area for the
use of indicators. Scholars have argued that companies have legal
obligations under international law, particularly for violations of human
rights, labor rights, and environmental protection.76 A variety of initiatives
have aimed to hold multinational companies accountable under domestic
or international law but they have remained largely ineffective. The
extraterritorial operations of companies are largely unregulated through
domestic law, with the exception of litigation under the U.S. Alien Tort
Claims Act, whose extraterritorial application to corporations was recently
curtailed by the U.S. Supreme Court.77 International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations, such as the UN, the International Labor
Organization (ILO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the ISO, have drafted standards and
principles addressed to companies (e.g., the UN Global Compact and ISO
26000) and governments (e.g., the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy).78 However, these voluntary
75. Fourcade, supra note 71, at 156.
76. See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
(2006); José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1
(2011); Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339 (2001); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931
(2004); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J.
443 (2001); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J.
INT’L L. 819 (2007).
77. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroelum, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). See also Julian G. Ku, The Curious
Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J.
INT’L L. 353 (2010) (challenging modern Alien Tort Statute doctrine and advocating for a more
restrictive approach to corporate liability under the statute).
78. INT’L LABOR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING
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instruments lack independent monitoring, implementation, enforcement
mechanisms, do not include performance metrics to assess compliance,
and are not certifiable.79 Self-regulatory initiatives by the private sector
(e.g., codes of conduct and industry programs) may have a normative
impact on corporate behavior, but are devoid of third-party accountability
systems and subject to critiques of greenwashing.80
As John Ruggie, the then-UN Special Representative on Business and
Human Rights to the Human Rights Council, concluded:
[T]here is no single silver bullet solution to the multi-faceted
challenges of business and human rights . . . . [T]he tools available
for dealing with business and human rights differ from those
addressing State-based human rights violations, where only public
international law can impose binding obligations. The business and
human rights domain is considerably more complex . . . . Moreover,
the standards that business initiatives incorporate are typically selfdefined rather than tracking internationally recognized human
rights. And accountability mechanisms for ensuring adherence to
the standards tend to remain weak and decoupled from firms’ own
core oversight and control systems.81
This state of affairs is ripe for governance through indicators. Given that
the international legal duties of corporations remain “ill-defined and
ineffective,”82 technologies of compliance can substitute for legal
regulation.83 If incorporated into domestic law, indicators can give teeth to
international legal norms by serving as a tool for evaluation and
implementation.
Enter the Global Reporting Initiative. The GRI was created in 1997 as a
framework for corporations to report on their environmental, social, and

MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
AND
SOCIAL
POLICY
(2006),
available
at
http://tinyurl.com/l4ewe5m; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000), available at http://tinyurl.com/6z97kv9;
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 26000: GUIDANCE ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2010);
The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://tinyurl.com/hoojj (last visited July
24, 2013).
79. See John Entine, UN Global Compact: Ten Years of Greenwashing?, ETHICAL CORP. (Nov. 1,
2010), available at . http://tinyurl.com/m9uewne.
80. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 76, at 958–60; cf. William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and
Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2003).
81. John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Draft Guiding
Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, pp. 1–3 (Nov.
1, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/k46gxoa.
82. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 76, at 948.
83. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88
TEX. L. REV. 669, 670–71(2010).
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economic performance.84 Its guidelines have become the global standard
for corporate sustainability reporting. They currently consist of standard
disclosures (e.g., organizational profile, stakeholder engagement, and
report parameters), reporting principles (e.g., materiality, stakeholder
inclusiveness, and accuracy), and, most notably, a set of seventy-nine
indicators (sub-divided into fifty core indicators and twenty-nine additional
indicators).85 Many indicators incorporate legal standards on such issues as
corporate governance, human rights, anti-discrimination, labor, corruption,
and the environment; they also reference a variety of international
agreements, including ILO conventions, OECD Guidelines, and U.N.
international human rights conventions.86 The indicators attempt to
convert legal norms into quantifiable metrics that are easily compared
across corporations and serve as a benchmark for improving performance.
While the GRI framework is a voluntary self-regulatory initiative
developed by a private, network-based organization, it is moving into the
realm of hard law through incorporation into mandatory regulations.87 The
GRI has influenced state governments and stock exchanges to adopt
binding and non-binding corporate disclosure standards based on its
guidelines. According to a recent study using data from fifty-eight
countries, mandatory disclosure of sustainability information has
significant consequences on socially responsible managerial practices.88
This research suggests that regulation based on GRI indicators has the
potential to improve corporate behavior.

A.

Overview of the GRI

“What you cannot measure, you cannot manage. What you cannot
manage, you cannot change.”89 This motto has motivated the GRI since it
was founded in Boston by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies (CERES).90 Supported by the UN Environment Program, the
84. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 2.
85. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 13.
86. Id.
87. In making this assertion, I disagree with a rigid hard versus soft law distinction and instead
view the division as a continuum between binding and non-binding rules. See Kenneth Abbott &
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Legal Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Andrew
T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171 (2010); Gregory C.
Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 712–17 (2010).
88. See Ioannis Ioannu & George Serafeim, The Consequences of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability
Reporting (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-100, 2012).
89. ISOS GROUP, GRI CERTIFIED SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING TRAINING PROGRAM, (June
2010) (on file with author).
90. CERES is a national network of environmental organizations, investors, and other public
interest groups with a mission of integrating sustainability into capital markets. See Who We Are,
CERES, http://www.ceres.org/about-us/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
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GRI receives funds from foundations, governments, and corporate
sponsors, and also generates income by directly providing services to GRI
users (e.g., training programs, executive seminars, and software tools).91 It
aims to empower civil society organizations to seek greater accountability
for corporate governance.92 Following a model of information regulation,
a GRI report would presumably “mobiliz[e] its recipients to demand
certain performance levels and enabl[e] activists and NGOs to reward
practices considered socially responsible and exert pressure on poor
performers.”93 The GRI seeks to raise sustainability reporting to the same
status as financial reporting by developing metrics for companies to
disclose on intangible assets such as human rights and environmental
performance.94 By presenting this information in a comparable and
consistent format through quantifiable measures, the GRI attempts to
signal that these intangibles have market value and can affect the financial
health of a company.
The GRI bases its legitimacy on a multi-stakeholder consultation
process among intergovernmental organizations, businesses, NGOs, and
labor unions.95 It is comprised of four permanent bodies: the Board of
Directors, the Secretariat based in Amsterdam (employing more than fifty
people), the Technical Advisory Committee, and the Stakeholder
Council.96 The Technical Advisory Committee is responsible for the
development and revision of the reporting framework, while the
Stakeholder Council deliberates on key strategic and policy issues, and
appoints the Board of Directors.97 The Stakeholder Council’s sixty
members are geographically representative and include twenty-two seats
for business, sixteen seats for NGOs, six seats for labor, and sixteen seats
for so-called “mediating institutions” (which include accounting and
consulting firms, foundations, and governments).98 Most of the members
of the Stakeholder Council are elected by a group of Organizational
Stakeholders, which include hundreds of organizations and individuals and
is dominated by large businesses and international consulting and

91. Income from direct services represents about 20% of the GRI’s budget. Interview with
representative of the Global Reporting Initiative, in Amsterdam, Neth. (Dec. 8, 2010).
92. See David L. Levy et al., The Contested Politics of Corporate Governance: The Case of the Global
Reporting Initiative, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 1, 8 (2010).
93. Id. See also sources cited in supra note 18.
94. Although its primary users are corporations, the GRI markets itself to all types of
organizations including NGOs and governmental agencies. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE,
GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING: A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR A COMMON FUTURE (2012).
95. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 2.
96. Id. at 48.
97. Id.
98. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE GRI STAKEHOLDER
COUNCIL (2009), available at http://tinyurl.com/l6xgyu6.
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accounting firms, with relatively few NGOs and organized labor
associations.99
The GRI has formed alliances with a variety of institutional partners
and promotes convergence around other corporate social responsibility
guidelines and principles.100 The most notable is between the GRI and the
UN Global Compact, which was announced in October 2006.101 As part
of this alliance, the GRI’s guidelines incorporate the Global Compact’s
requirements for signatory companies that annually report a
Communication on Progress.102 The GRI and the Global Compact have
also published a draft tool to guide companies in linking the two reporting
processes.103 The GRI has formed linkages with other standards, including
the International Finance Corporation’s sustainability performance
standards, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), ISO 26000, and the
OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.104 These alliances serve
to deflect competition from similar initiatives such as the CDP, whose
climate change reporting framework is used by over 3,000 companies
around the world.105
The GRI guidelines are voluntary and incremental, and include a high
level of flexibility, allowing companies to decide which principles and
indicators to adopt.106 They are designed to improve over time to reflect
lessons learned and the changing expectations of companies and
stakeholders. The first Sustainability Reporting Guidelines were established
99. Levy et al., supra note 92, at 88, 96.
100. See Alliances and Synergies, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://tinyurl.com/mh95d68
(last visited July 24, 2013).
101. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE & THE GLOBAL COMPACT, MAKING THE
CONNECTION: THE GRI GUIDELINES AND THE UNGC COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS (2007).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE & INT’L FINANCE CORP., GETTING MORE VALUE
OUT OF SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING: CONNECTING IFC’S SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS AND THE GRI REPORTING FRAMEWORK (2010); GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE &
CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, LINKING UP GRI AND CDP: HOW DO THE GLOBAL REPORTING
INITIATIVE REPORTING GUIDELINES MATCH WITH THE CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT
QUESTIONS? (2010); GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI & ISO 26000: HOW TO USE THE GRI
GUIDELINES IN CONJUNCTION WITH ISO 26000 (2010); Press Release, Global Reporting Initiative,
New Partnership to Help Multinational Companies Operate Responsibly (Dec. 13, 2010) (available at
http://tinyurl.com/kpf2tps).
105. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
The GRI is distinct from the CDP because it addresses broader elements of sustainability reporting
covering social and governance issues in addition to environmental issues. Yet there is considerable
overlap between the GRI’s environmental indicators and the CDP’s questions on energy
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.
106. Indicator protocols are available to guide organizations as to how to define the relevant
terms, compile data, and find potential information sources. In addition, the GRI has produced a
variety of sector supplements (e.g., on financial services, electric utilities, and the mining sector) that
provide additional guidance and appropriate indicators for companies in that industry. See GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 4.
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in 2000. The GRI released its second generation of guidelines (G2) in
2002, and then its third version (G3) in late 2006.107 The G3 guidelines
were the product of a two-year development process which involved about
3,000 stakeholders worldwide and provided public comment
opportunities.108 Among the revisions from G2 to G3 are the elaboration
of methods for calculating indicators, the requirement of disclosure of an
organization’s management approach, and broad applicability of the
guidelines to private and public actors, including small and large
companies, NGOs, and public agencies. The GRI has recently completed
updates in the areas of human rights, gender, community impacts, and
materiality, which resulted in its G3.1 guidelines (released in March
2011).109 Finally, in October 2010, the GRI announced that it will begin
developing the fourth generation of its guidelines (G4), which are
scheduled to be released in 2013.110 The general aim behind G4 is to
increase the robustness of the guidelines in order to further mainstream
sustainability reporting and eventually combine it with financial reporting
as part of one “integrated report.”111
In accordance with the quantity (but not quality) of disclosure,
companies self-declare their score as A, B, or C, which the GRI refers to
as its “application level.”112 Companies at level C have reported on a
minimum of ten GRI indicators, including at least one from each of the
environmental, social, and economic categories. Level B means that
companies have disclosed their management approach (e.g., their goals,
monitoring, and relevant policies) and reported on at least twenty
indicators, with at least one from each of the environmental and economic
categories as well as one from each of the social sub-categories of human
rights, labor, society, and product responsibility. Level A means that
companies have disclosed their management approach and reported on all
fifty core indicators, or alternatively, explained the reason why certain
indicators were omitted (such as a lack of materiality for the company). As
107. Halina Szejnwald Brown et al., The Rise of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as a Case of
Institutional Entrepreneurship, 18 ENVTL. POL. 182 (2009).
108. The GRI follows the same multi-stakeholder consultative approach when developing its
sector supplements.
109. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 13.
110. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW, available at
http://tinyurl.com/lpeh7n5.
111. See Press Release, IIRC, GRI and IIRC Deepen Cooperation to Shape the Future of Global
Reporting (Mar. 1, 2013) (available at http://tinyurl.com/mc7ynuh). The GRI recently joined a
group of professional accounting bodies, auditing firms, international organizations, companies, and
non-governmental organizations to form the International Integrated Reporting Committee, whose
aim is to promote the adoption of a global standard for integrated reporting among companies
worldwide. For more information on integrated reporting, see ROBERT G. ECCLES & MICHAEL P.
KRZUS, ONE REPORT: INTEGRATED REPORTING FOR A SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY (2010).
112. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 19.
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part of this process, companies undergo a materiality test to determine
which issues to report on based on such factors as what is important to
stakeholders, the existence of relevant laws and regulations, and whether
the issue may pose a significant risk. Level A companies must also report
on indicators in its sector supplement, if one is available. Finally,
companies have the option of adding a “+” to their level (e.g., an A+) if a
third-party assurance provider has verified its data. Therefore, if no “+” is
present, there has been no external verification of the information in a
company’s GRI report.113
While companies could choose from over thirty different reporting
frameworks in the 1990s, the GRI has now become “the de facto
international reporting standard.”114 According to a 2008 study by the
accounting firm KPMG, more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune
250 companies and nearly seventy percent of the 100 largest companies by
revenue use GRI guidelines as the basis for their reporting.115 As of 2013,
there were at least 5,470 organizations reporting in eighty-one countries,
based on those that submitted their reports to the GRI.116 What is the
motivation for companies to use GRI?
In jurisdictions where there is no mandatory regulation to report on
sustainability, there are a variety of reasons why companies nevertheless
choose to do so — e.g., gaining competitive advantage through “improved
management of ESG [(environmental, social, and governance)] impacts
and overall risk, enhancement of company reputation, and a greater ability
to attract and retain both customers and talent.”117 As part of a strategic
approach, companies use the GRI guidelines to develop internal metrics
that track their social and environmental performance, identify potential
risks, and integrate sustainability goals with their overall business
objectives. In addition, companies may feel pressure to report because
their industry peers are doing so, or in order to deflect civil society
pressure after a prominent environmental or human rights incident. In this
case, reporting may be part of a public relations exercise and not reflect
any real desire to enhance performance.
There have been a number of critiques of the GRI, both by NGOs and
companies themselves. NGOs have criticized the GRI for its division of
indicators into core indicators and additional ones that are optional and up
to the discretion of companies to include, even if they may be important to
113. Id.
114. Richard MacLean & Kathee Rebernak, Closing the Credibility Gap: The Challenges of Corporate
Responsibility Reporting, 16 ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT. 1, 1 (2007).
115. KPMG INT’L, supra note 14.
116. The GRI keeps an updated inventory of reports from 1999 through the present, which is
available
on
their
website.
See
Reporting,
GLOBAL
REPORTING
INITIATIVE,
http://tinyurl.com/l5rf99q (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
117. MacLean & Rebernak, supra note 114, at 2–3.
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certain stakeholders. Civil society groups have also questioned the
credibility of third-party verification services (usually performed by private
accounting and consulting firms), given that there are no uniform
guidelines to ensure their reliability.118 At the same time, companies have
complained that they are on a “reporting treadmill,” where they spend so
much time gathering data that they are left with few resources to
implement changes in the organization.119 Finally, there is a general
concern that the GRI ranks reports based on the level of disclosure (e.g.,
the number of indicators that companies report on) rather than the quality
and accuracy of a firm’s sustainability performance.120 I will expand upon
these critiques in Part III in my discussion of the unintended
consequences of using indicators like the GRI.

B.

The GRI’s Impact on Domestic Regulation and Financial Markets

The GRI has moved into the realm of hard law by shaping regulation by
regional organizations, states, and stock exchanges. It has recently begun
promoting mandatory government regulation on sustainability reporting as
well as integrated reporting within the global financial framework, as
evidenced by a recent session on the topic at the 2011 World Economic
Forum.121 The primary motivation behind the GRI’s lobbying efforts is
that the majority of companies are still not reporting on sustainability.
About 4,000 companies are currently issuing CSR reports, which
represents a ten-fold increase since the mid-1990s.122 Just over one-third of
those reporters (about 1,400 companies) used the GRI guidelines in
2009.123 As previously mentioned, three-quarters of the Global Fortune
250 companies use the GRI.124 That means that many small and mediumsized companies are still not using the GRI, or issuing sustainability
reports at all. In an effort to increase participation, the GRI has recently
begun encouraging regulation in the disclosure of environmental and social
issues.
The GRI’s promotion of regulation represents a significant shift in its
role and mission, from an independent organization that encourages
companies to voluntarily report on sustainability to a more advocacy118. See David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance Regulation:
Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 470–71 (2008).
119. Paul Leavoy, Does CSR Reporting Help the Planet, or Just Help Reporting?, GREENBIZ.COM (Sept.
30, 2010), http://tinyurl.com/mst6xl6.
120. Hess, supra note 118, at 463.
121. Press Release, Global Reporting Initiative, World Economic Forum Discusses Integrated
Reporting (Feb. 2, 2011) (available at http://tinyurl.com/n7lb7rg).
122. CORPORATEREGISTER.COM, CR REPORTING AWARDS ’10: GLOBAL WINNERS AND
REPORTING TRENDS 4, (2010).
123. Id. at 6.
124. See KPMG, INT’L, supra note 14.
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oriented organization that is partnering with governments to promote
mandatory reporting. While states had historically only provided funding
to the GRI and had no direct involvement in its operation, they are now
actively participating in its decision making process. In connection with
this shift, the GRI established a Governmental Advisory Group in 2008 to
provide advice to its Board of Directors and executive team, and suggest
ways of increasing GRI participation through regulatory initiatives.125 The
Governmental Advisory Group is also trying to resolve institutional and
legislative fragmentation on sustainability reporting.126 In addition, in 2009
the GRI Board signed the Amsterdam Declaration, which cites the recent
global financial crisis and lack of trust in economic institutions as a
justification for more transparency in economic, social, and governance
(ESG) reporting.127 The declaration calls on governments to strengthen
the global sustainability reporting regime:
[T]he Board of the GRI calls on governments to take leadership by:
1. Introducing policy requiring companies to report on ESG
factors or publicly explain why they have not done so.
2. Requiring ESG reporting by their public bodies — in
particular: state owned companies, government pension funds
and public investment agencies.
3. Integrating sustainability reporting within the emerging
global financial regulatory framework being developed by leaders
of the G20.128
In support of the Amsterdam Declaration, the GRI is working closely with
governments to pass regulations on sustainability reporting.
The current regulatory landscape reflects a movement towards more
government-sponsored legislation, standards, and guidelines on
sustainability reporting. According to a 2010 report, there are 142 country
standards that include a sustainability-related reporting requirement or
guidance.129 Two-thirds of those regulations are mandatory, and a number
of them explicitly cite GRI guidelines.130

125. See
Governmental
Advisory
Group,
GLOBAL
REPORTING
INITIATIVE,
http://tinyurl.com/mksqok4 (last visited July 24, 2013).
126. Interview with representative of the Global Reporting Initiative, in Amsterdam, Neth. (Dec.
9, 2010).
127. Press Release, Global Reporting Initiative, The Amsterdam Declaration on Transparency
and Reporting (Mar. 10, 2009) (available at http://tinyurl.com/mvyqetl).
128. Id.
129. U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME ET AL., CARROTS AND STICKS—PROMOTING
TRANSPARENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY: AN UPDATE ON TRENDS IN VOLUNTARY AND
MANDATORY APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 4 (2010).
130. Id.
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European countries, in particular, are at the forefront of mandatory
reporting regulations. France was one of the earliest countries to mandate
ESG disclosure. Its 2001 New Economic Regulation requires all listed
companies to report on forty social and environmental criteria in their
annual reports.131 The Swedish government requires state-owned
enterprises to issue sustainability reports in accordance with GRI’s G3
guidelines and subject to external assurance.132 Spain similarly enacted
legislation that requires state-owned companies and businesses with over
1,000 employees to produce sustainability reports beginning in 2012.133 As
of 2009, Denmark requires disclosure of CSR activities in financial
statements by both state-owned companies and companies with total
assets of more than 19 million euros, revenues more than 38 million euros,
and more than 250 employees — totaling about 1,100 companies.134 In
addition, Denmark’s mandate extends to institutional investors, investment
associations, and other listed financial businesses.135 The guidance notes to
Denmark’s amended Financial Statements Act encourages the use of GRI
guidelines to fulfill the reporting requirement.136
The other EU countries have adopted similar legislation to implement
the EU Modernisation Directive on corporate disclosure of non-financial
information. Existing EU law mandates private companies to include nonfinancial key performance indicators in their annual reports “where
appropriate” and “[t]o the extent necessary for an understanding of the
company's development, performance or position.”137 The European
Commission is considering improvements to this policy because the
requirements for disclosure (including indicators) are unclear and EU
member states can choose to exempt small and medium-sized
enterprises.138 The Commission hosted a series of workshops to explore
131. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM] art. L. 225-102-1 (Fr).
132. REGERINGSKANSLIET [SWEDISH MINISTRY OF ENTERPRISE, ENERGY, AND
COMMUNICATIONS], GUIDELINES FOR EXTERNAL REPORTING BY STATE-OWNED COMPANIES
(2007).
133. Ley 2/2011 de 4 de Marzo, de Economía Sostenible (B.O.E. 2011, 55) (Spain) (Spain’s
sustainable economy law).
134. Financial Statements Act, 2008, § 99A (Den.). The Danish law follows a principle of report
or explain, which requires companies to either disclose their CSR activities or give reasons for not
having any.
135. Id.
136. DANISH COMMERCE & COMPANIES AGENCY, REPORTING ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: AN INTRODUCTION FOR SUPERVISORY AND EXECUTIVE BOARDS (English
Version) 15 (2009).
137. See Directive 2003/51/EC, art. 1(14), of the European Parliament and of the Counsel of 18
June 2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 86/635/EEC, and 91/674/EEC on the Annual and
Consolidated Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, Banks, and Other Financial Institutions and
Insurance Undertakings, 2003 O.J. (L 178).
138. European Workshop on Disclosure of Environmental, Social and Governance Information, at 16 (2010),
available at http://tinyurl.com/n4rv3tr.
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possible policy revisions in 2009 and 2010 and completed its public
consultation in late January 2011.139 Among the recommendations that are
being considered is for EU policy to use the GRI guidelines as a reference
point for corporate reporting.140
In addition to mandatory regulations, governments are issuing voluntary
guidelines on sustainability reporting for companies and public agencies,
many of which cite the GRI guidelines. For instance, Australia’s
Department of Economics and Heritage issued a guide to reporting using
GRI-consistent environmental indicators, and its Minerals Council (an
industry group) recommends public sustainability reporting under GRI’s
Mining and Metals Sector Supplement.141 The Canadian government has
also endorsed the GRI for CSR reporting by the extractive sector.142 In
2007, Japan released its Environmental Reporting Guidelines, which cite
GRI guidelines and require environmental reporting for specified
corporations.143
Stock exchanges are another important driving force behind
sustainability reporting. They are encouraging companies to be transparent
as to their sustainability performance and, in some cases, mandating
disclosure. Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange must disclose
in their annual reports any non-financial information relevant to their
business, although they do not have to file a full-length CSR report.144 In
Australia, companies listed on its national exchange must disclose the
extent to which they have followed the Corporate Governance Principles
and Recommendations, which include sustainability issues.145 Emerging
market countries are also promoting voluntary standards in CSR reporting
through the involvement of local stock exchanges. All companies listed on
139. See Public consultation on non-financial reporting, Reporting and disclosure, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://tinyurl.com/jw9rt9j (last visited July 24, 2013).
140. European Workshop on Disclosure of Environmental, Social and Governance Information, supra note
138.
141. AUSTRALIA DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE, TRIPLE BOTTOM
LINE REPORTING IN AUSTRALIA: A GUIDE TO REPORTING AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL
INDICATORS (2003); MINERALS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA: AUSTRALIAN MINERALS INDUSTRY
FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT “ENDURING VALUE,” (2005).
142. THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECTION ESR COUNSELLOR, BUILDING THE
CANADIAN ADVANTAGE: A CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) STRATEGY FOR THE
CANADIAN
INTERNATIONAL
EXTRACTIVE
SECTOR
(2009),
available
at
http://tinyurl.com/m64vb6w.
143. GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN: MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
REPORTING GUIDELINES: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY (Provisional Translation) 112
(2007); [Law Concerning the Promotion of Business Activities with Environmental Consideration],
Law No. 77 of 2004, http://tinyurl.com/n2cce89 (Japan).
144. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 417 (U.K.).
145. AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES EXCHANGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 5, 33–34 (2007). Disclosure under these recommendations is on an “if not,
why” basis.
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the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are required to follow the King Report
on Corporate Governance, which mandates integrated reporting that
incorporates financial and non-financial information.146 China’s Shanghai
Stock Exchange encourages companies to file annual CSR reports and
develop a CSR strategy, and provides incentives for doing so, such as
priority election into the prestigious Shanghai Corporate Governance
Sector.147 The Bovespa Stock Exchange in Brazil has played an influential
role in raising ESG standards among companies as part of an active
national movement for more sustainable investment.148 Many exchanges
have also created socially responsible investing indices.149 The motivation
for this activity includes demand from investors for sustainability-related
information and the development of specialized markets for sustainable
investment niches, particularly in emerging market countries.150 Interest in
sustainability issues is not restricted to socially responsible investors. In
fact, there are more than 1100 asset owners, investment managers, and
service providers with $32 trillion in assets that are signatories to the UN’s
Principles for Responsible Investment, which promotes incorporation of
ESG issues in investment analysis and decision making and disclosure of
those issues in annual financial reports.151
This brings us to the United States. U.S.-based companies have lagged
in participation in the GRI, although there has been a significant increase
in recent years.152 The SEC has been at the center of regulatory efforts to
mandate corporate sustainability reporting. Over the past decade, advocacy
and investor groups (including some of the largest U.S. pension funds)
have successfully engaged with and formally petitioned the SEC to issue
guidance on existing rules, increase shareholder rights, and develop new
disclosure requirements. On October 27, 2009, the SEC reversed an
existing policy (under Rule 14A-8(I)(7)) that had allowed companies to
exclude shareholder resolutions requesting information on financial risks

146. INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS SOUTHERN AFRICA, KING REPORT ON GOVERNANCE FOR
SOUTH AFRICA 10 (2009).
147. See Investing in a sustainable future, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE (Sept. 5, 2012)
http://tinyurl.com/lpwjzzb; Raising CSR standards and disclosure practices, WORLD FEDERATION
OF EXCHANGES (Aug. 2009), http://tinyurl.com/lqgcv8u.
148. See KPMG INT’L ET AL., supra note 15, at 77.
149. Id. at 14.
150. Id.
151. UNITED NATIONS, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: ANNUAL REPORT 2012,
at 2 (2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/lkz3cw6.
152. Between 2009 and 2010, there was a 30% increase of GRI-based sustainability reporting in
the United States although there is a still a disproportionately low percentage of assured reporting
(i.e., reporting that is verified through a third-party assurance provider). See Mehrdad Nazari, GRI
Reporting Grows by 30% in USA and 50% in Canada, PRIZMABLOG.COM, (Mar. 9, 2011)
http://tinyurl.com/ketlsww.
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associated with environmental, social, and human rights issues.153 In
January 2010, the agency released an interpretive guidance note on the
disclosure of climate change risks in financial filings.154 The note cited the
GRI as a model for sustainability reporting in its 2010 guidance note
regarding disclosure related to climate change.155 The premise behind the
interpretation is that a company’s 10-K annual report should include
discussion of material risks, which may include climate change and other
sustainability-related risks. Notably, the guidance note cited the GRI as a
model framework for sustainability reporting.
There is current pressure on the SEC to require companies to assess
and disclose on not only climate-related risks but also other material
environmental, social, and governance risks. A petition to former SEC
Chairwoman Mary Schapiro by an association of investment professionals
proposed that the agency “require issuers to report annually on a
comprehensive, uniform set of sustainability indicators . . . and that the
SEC define this as the highest level of the current version of the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) reporting guidelines.”156
Consistent with that request, the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee
(IAC) took an initial step towards considering ESG disclosure. The IAC
was created by Chairwoman Schapiro in 2009 to give greater voice to
investors and was regularly attended by several Commissioners as well as
senior SEC officials.157 The Committee was recently codified as a
permanent institution under the Dodd-Frank Act and will soon be
reconstituted with members appointed by the entire Commission.158
Among the IAC’s priorities was ESG disclosure, which was studied by the
Investor as Owner Subcommittee. On May 18, 2010, the subcommittee
met with a panel of experts on ESG issues, including the GRI’s Director
of Sustainability Reporting.159 Before being temporarily disbanded in light
of the Dodd-Frank Act, the subcommittee’s final resolution reflects a
153. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Corporate Fin., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (CF) (Oct. 27,
2009). Shareholder activism on environmental and social issues is becoming a significant source of
pressure on companies. During the 2010 corporate proxy season, there were a record 100
shareholder-driven proposals related to climate change issues. Lori Pizzani, Disclosing Environmental
Risks, CFA MAGAZINE, Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 35.
154. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate
Change; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
155. Id. at 6292.
156. Letter from Lisa Woll, CEO of Social Investment Forum, to Mary Schapiro, Chairwoman of
the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 21, 2009) (on file with author).
157. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Creation of Investor Advisory
Committee (June 3, 2009), available at http://tinyurl.com/pv8822.
158. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 911, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
159. Memorandum from Elizabeth Murphy, Fed. Advisory Comm. Act Comm. Mgmt. Officer,
to Michael McTiernan, Div. of Corp. Fin. Staff Member (Sept. 30, 2010) (on file with author).
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recognition that ESG disclosure is a priority that should be addressed by
the SEC:
The Investor as Owner Subcommittee of the Investor Advisory
Committee believes that the SEC should develop dedicated internal
resources to monitor and advise on developments regarding the
disclosure of corporate social and environmental performance data.
Activities could include:
 Monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of current US
disclosure requirements and enforcement measures;
 Monitoring global developments and participating in
appropriate fora;
 Serving as a point of contact for investors, issuers and other
stakeholders on these issues; and
 Making recommendations to the Commission where
appropriate.
The Investor as Owner Subcommittee of the Investor Advisory
Committee further believes that periodic public reports on these
activities be produced.160
The above resolution is not binding on the SEC, and it remains to be seen
how much weight will be accorded to it by the yet-to-be constituted new
IAC.
There are a variety of obstacles that may prevent the SEC releasing
additional guidance or requirements for ESG disclosure. The agency
currently does not have the requisite expertise and capacity to make
meaningful decisions on the costs and benefits of mandating
environmental and social reporting. SEC officials perceive that there is
insufficient interest among mainstream investors, as opposed to socially
responsible investors.161 Moreover, while ESG disclosure remains on the
SEC’s long-term agenda, it has become less of a short-term priority given
the resources needed to implement the Dodd-Frank Act.162
The Dodd-Frank Act includes three provisions that are particularly
relevant to ESG reporting, which suggests the incremental fashion by
which sustainability reporting is being mandated in the United States.
Section 1502 imposes a new reporting requirement on publicly traded
companies that manufacture products using certain conflict minerals.163
For example, companies must identify whether the sourcing of the
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Interview with SEC officials, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 2010).
Id.
Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 158, § 1502.
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minerals originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). If so,
they must submit an independent private sector audit report on due
diligence measures taken to avoid using minerals that directly or indirectly
finance armed groups in the DRC.164 Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act
imposes new disclosure requirements on mine safety.165 Mining companies
must disclose in their annual and quarterly reports to the SEC on the
safety and health requirements that apply to mines under the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977.166 Finally, section 1504 requires natural
resources companies to disclose certain payments made to governments
for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.167
Outside of the SEC, there are notable efforts by federal agencies to
incorporate GRI reporting. Under an executive order signed in January
2010 entitled “Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and
Economic Performance,” all federal agencies are required to issue a
strategic sustainability performance plan.168 In addition to developing a
plan that includes quantifiable metrics and sustainability goals, agencies
must also inventory their greenhouse gas emissions and set targets to
reduce their emissions by 2020.169 Each agency must also appoint a senior
sustainability officer, and the Chair of the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) will report agency results to the President.170 Since the U.S.
Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Postal Service already issue GRI-based
reports, GRI representatives are lobbying the CEQ to recommend that all
agencies issue their strategic sustainability performance plans under a GRI
model.171
Efforts to regulate sustainability reporting in the United States are still
slow compared to efforts in other countries. In order to raise its U.S.
profile, the GRI officially launched a focal point office in New York City
on January 31, 2011.172 The opening ceremony took place at the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) with a panel discussion on “Why is America
Letting the World Lead in Sustainability Reporting?” This event was a
clear effort to engage financial leaders and information providers who
could then motivate U.S. companies to report on sustainability using the
164. Id.
165. Id. § 1503.
166. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
167. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 158, § 1504.
168. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52117 (Oct. 5, 2009).
169. Id. §§ 2, 8.
170. Id. §§ 3, 16.
171. Interview with Mike Wallace, Director of U.S. Focal Point, Global Reporting Initiative, in
N.Y.C., N.Y. (Dec. 2, 2010).
172. Press Release, Global Reporting Initiative, GRI Launches its Focal Point USA (Jan. 12,
2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/kaok8l9.
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GRI. Among the participants at the event were Bloomberg and NYSE
Euronext, the leading global operators of financial markets and providers
of trading technologies.173
An essential component of the GRI’s strategy in the United States is
garnering and publicizing support of the initiative among market data
providers. A significant development in this direction came in late 2009
when Bloomberg began providing 120 ESG variables for public
companies on its 250,000 data terminals.174 Users now have access to this
data at no additional cost and can manipulate it in the same way as
traditional financial metrics. By adding ESG data, Bloomberg recognizes
that mainstream institutional investors, not just socially responsible
investors, will increasingly consider sustainability performance in their
investment decisions. In presentations to business associations and
industry groups (including the Business Roundtable, the National
Association of Corporate Directors, and the National Investor Relations
Institute), the GRI highlights how Bloomberg and other information
providers, such as Thomson Reuters, NASDAQ, RiskMetrics, and KLD
Research & Analytics, rely on GRI reports when compiling ESG data.175
According to a Bloomberg representative, “to make our content relevant
to the marketplace, we needed to display the information exactly in the
format provided by GRI, as this has become the market standard.”176 For
instance, when a Bloomberg user selects a company’s water consumption
variable, she is immediately linked to the company’s GRI report. If the
company has not issued a report, then the cell will remain blank. The GRI
hopes that companies will therefore feel pressure from investors to
disclose their social and environmental data and, over time, improve their
performance.177
Rating agencies and sustainability indices are other potential avenues to
pressure companies to report using the GRI. Many rating agencies build
their methodologies around GRI indicators although they are not
necessarily public about it.178 One index that explicitly relies on GRI
metrics is NASDAQ’s Global Sustainability 50 Index.179 In the fall of
173. Id.
174. See Mindy S. Lubber, Is ESG Data Going Mainstream?, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW BLOG
(May 6, 2009), http://tinyurl.com/ljcl4nc; see also Bloomberg Sustainability, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/bsustainable/ (last visited June 24, 2013).
175. Mike Wallace, Director of U.S. Focal Point, Global Reporting Initiative, GRI Reporting
Trends (2010) (on file with author).
176. Id.
177. Client demand has spurred banks like Goldman Sachs to integrate ESG criteria into their
investment research. See GOLDMAN SACHS, ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY
SUMMARY OF 2010 (2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/m7c9jjo.
178. Interview with Mike Wallace, Director of U.S. Focal Point, Global Reporting Initiative, in
New York, N.Y. (Dec. 2, 2010).
179. See NASDAQ OMX, NASDAQ OMX CRD Global Sustainability Index SM Methodology
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2009, the index removed twenty-three firms, including Cisco, Microsoft,
and Oracle, for failing to disclose on a minimum of forty percent of core
GRI indicators.180 While indices and rating agencies track reporting based
on the indicators, however, they do not track performance or
improvement over time.

III. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF USING INDICATORS IN GOVERNANCE
Indicators are not neutral instruments that can be applied mechanically.
They are normative tools that embed certain values and shape behavior
according to a standard.181 They also carry potential costs. Whether
indicators play a beneficial or harmful role in turn can influence the
perceived legitimacy of the government agencies and private actors that
produce and rely on them.182 Whether civil society perceives an actor as
legitimate will affect the agency’s right to govern, its claim to authority, and
the likelihood of compliance with its directives.183 Based on personal
interviews with GRI staff in Amsterdam and New York City, and
observations at a GRI-certified training session, I will identify potential
costs associated with using indicators, which challenge their effectiveness
in meaningfully comparing units of analysis and evaluating performance.

A.

The Promotion of Box Ticking and Superficial Compliance

The use of indicators risks producing a box ticking approach to
compliance, which entails superficial or cosmetic changes without any
substantive effects on behavior. Box ticking refers to a “rigid, mechanical
practice involving the use of needlessly detailed ‘standardized checklists’
and pursued without regard to weighing costs against benefits.”184 The
scientific authority of indicators and their focus on transparency can
conceal behavioral changes (or the lack thereof) and lead to data gathering
(Jan. 2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/mvvhzoy.
180. Marc Gunther, Investors Urge More Tech Firms to Follow Intel’s Lead and Embrace Green,
GREENBIZ.COM (June 1, 2010), http://tinyurl.com/2wje9tr.
181. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Criteria for Normative Technology: The Acceptability of ‘Code as Law’ in Light of
Democratic and Constitutional Values, in REGULATORY TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES,
REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 157 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds.,
2008).
182. I am primarily interested in procedural legitimacy, which focuses on fair procedures
according to principles of transparency, accountability, democratic deliberation, and participation. See
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); Thomas M. Franck,
Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705 (1988).
183. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 602–03 (1999); David D. Caron, The Legitimacy
of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 558 (1993).
184. MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD OF RISK
MANAGEMENT 153 (2007).
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for its own sake, with a preference for precise but not necessarily relevant
data.185 As a result, indicators run the risk of promoting business interests
at the expense of public interests, thus drawing regulation away from its
primary purpose and not measuring what is important.186 Organizations
that produce indicators may become more preoccupied with perpetuating
their existence and raising their status, rather than using the indicators as a
tool to shape behavior. In this way, the process of producing more and
better indicators becomes an end in itself.
When indicators are used in regulatory governance, there can be a
slippage between their initial goals and intended audience, and the goals
and audience that evolve over time. For instance, the GRI training session
that I attended was exclusively focused on revising indicators and
disclosing more information, rather than promoting its original aim of
corporate accountability. When the GRI was founded, the intended
audience for its reports was communities, consumers, non-governmental
organizations, and shareholders who would presumably read the reports,
encourage companies to improve their performance on sustainability
issues, and thereby shift the balance of power in corporate governance.187
However, the focus of the GRI’s activities has now become the users (the
companies) — the GRI devotes significant resources to developing
learning tools, training courses, and services for report preparers and
users.188 A GRI official that I interviewed admitted that the GRI’s main
audience is companies and that its primary motivation is to increase
company participation.189 Here we see a gap between the GRI’s stated goal
of multi-stakeholder consensus-building and its actual operations.
The GRI is no longer aimed at empowering its original audience to hold
corporations accountable. For instance, it is questionable who actually
reads the reports. According to one study, “there is widespread agreement
that the [GRI] reports are not studied in any detail.”190 My interviews
revealed that GRI officials themselves acknowledge the low readership of
GRI reports.191 Even among those actors that read the reports, many do
not find them useful. A major U.S. environmental NGO representative
185. Id. at 167.
186. The process by which regulated firms and special interest groups end up co-opting and
manipulating the agencies that are supposed to control them is called “regulatory capture.” See
STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 17–18 (2008).
187. See Levy et al., supra note 92, at 8.
188. See Reporting Support, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://tinyurl.com/l9jqf8e (last
viewed July 24, 2013).
189. Interview with representative of the Global Reporting Initiative, in Amsterdam, Neth. (Dec.
7, 2010).
190. Levy et al., supra note 92, at 103.
191. Interviews with representatives of the Global Reporting Initiative, in Amsterdam, Neth.
(Dec. 7, 8, 2010).
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noted: “We don’t really use GRI reports . . . . [A] single number is not
enough; we are interested in [the] strategies and plans behind the
numbers.”192 Others noted that the information “does not give an
adequate picture of the impacts on local communities, . . . [and] is too
processes oriented, rather than [focused on] performance.”193 NGOs also
do not trust the data, which usually is not verified by a third party. They
only pay attention to whether a company releases a report but not its
actual content. What becomes important then is simply the procedural
exercise of filling out a report or, in other words, superficial compliance.
The GRI’s application levels further reinforce its focus on transparency
for its own sake rather than actual improvements in behavior. Recall that
the GRI attaches an application level to a report largely based on the
number of indicators that a company reports on.194 A company receives an
“A” if it reports on at least fifty indicators, a “B” for twenty, and a “C” for
ten.195 That means that a company that is destroying the environment
could nevertheless get an “A” for reporting on fifty or more indicators (as
well as disclosing its management approach). Thus, the application levels
are based on the level of disclosure, rather than the quality and accuracy of
a firm’s actual performance. One GRI official admitted that there is a
general misconception that the application levels serve as a ranking based
on quality of performance, rather than an objective classification of the
level of transparency:
What we’ve seen is that it’s . . . a challenge on the communication
side. So often the levels have been presented as being a grade or a
quality mark or a performance related statement, which has been
quite difficult for us to counteract. I mean, whenever we came
across something like that we would contact the company and then
ask them to change the statement, but of course, since we’re an
international organization you can never ensure that you find
everything . . . . That’s also inherent in the system [of] “A,” “B,”
and “C” in a U.S. context. It has a completely different connotation
in the European context, for instance [where school grades are
numeric].196
Another GRI official explained that it may be more worthwhile for a
company to devote resources to managing change and improving

192. Levy et al., supra note 92, at 103.
193. Halina Szejnwald Brown et al., Building Institutions Based on Information Disclosure: Lessons from
GRI’s Sustainability Reporting, 17 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 571, 576 (2009).
194. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 19.
195. See infra Part II.A for a more detailed description of the application levels.
196. Interview with representative of the Global Reporting Initiative, in Amsterdam, Neth. (Dec.
8, 2010).
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performance rather than moving up levels for its own sake.197 Moreover,
external verification is only optional, and a company could add a “+” to its
application level even if only a small portion of its report has been
externally verified.198 Third-party verifiers like accounting firms do not
have to comply with a uniform assurance standard.199 Here we see that the
motivation behind the producers of the GRI is not that the reports are
actually read by NGOs or whether they reflect a company’s good or bad
performance, but that more and more companies participate and release
reports. As the GRI enhances its profile and perpetuates its status as the
market leader in sustainability reporting, it may be undermining its
legitimacy and the purported goals behind its indicators.

B.

The Dominance of Technical Experts over Decision Making

Because indicators rely on numerically-rendered data, technical experts
(both within government agencies and private actors) exercise considerable
power over decision making and the interpretation of legal norms. While
their specialized knowledge and political neutrality can be a benefit for
policy making,200 it is difficult for stakeholders to challenge the power of
experts and their methodology and assumptions in producing the
indicators. Since indicators carry scientific authority, they mask potential
conflicts of interest among technical experts and leave little room for
contestation. This is the case for the GRI, where accounting firms are
heavily involved in both indicator production and data verification.
Providing assurance for sustainability reports has become a growing
business, especially for accounting companies that have been seeking
credibility following the Enron scandal.201 As a result, “[a] large service
industry comprised largely of sustainability consultancies and auditing
firms has emerged around the revisions of the guidelines, preparations of
reports, their verification, stakeholder outreach, and various efforts to
standardize and institutionalize the above activities.”202 These firms
arguably derive more economic benefit from the GRI than any other
stakeholder. In fact, some firms such as KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
and Deloitte have recently established global sustainability practice groups

197. Interview with representative of the Global Reporting Initiative, in Amsterdam, Neth. (Dec.
7, 2010).
198. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 19.
199. Id.
200. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); David B. Spence &
Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000).
201. See Carol A. Tilt, Corporate Responsibility, Accounting and Accountants, in PROFESSIONALS’
PERSPECTIVES OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 11-32 (Idowu & Filho eds., 2009).
202. Levy et al., supra note 92, at 97.

610

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 53:575

that specifically focus on corporate sustainability measurement and
reporting.203
The role of accounting firms as independent third-parties is dubious
given that they are actively governing the same organization that they are
presumably regulating. Representatives from large accounting firms
occupy key positions in the GRI’s governance structure, including the
Board of Directors, from which they advise on the methodology and
interpretation of indicators.204 In an informational brochure about its
sustainability practice, Deloitte advertises that it:
has been involved in every stage of the GRI’s growth and
development . . . . Deloitte member firms were involved in the
2002 revision of the GRI guidelines, as well as the 2006 revision at
which the current G3 guidelines were drafted. Many Deloitte
member firm professionals have played key roles in the GRI
governance and stakeholder bodies . . . . Moreover, Deloitte
member firm teams both advise clients on reporting and assurance
according to GRI guidelines and collaborate . . . on GRI-sponsored
training.205
The big four accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers) have also recently sponsored the GRI’s new
U.S. office for the first two years.206 Yet these same firms also have a stake
in increasing the market for their services. Given that the firms may
provide other services to their clients, such as financial auditing, they have
an interest in trying to package their financial and non-financial services
together. More companies using GRI and seeking external assurance
represents a significant revenue opportunity for the big accounting firms.
Given the proliferation of performance codes, standards, and other
forms of voluntary self-regulation, the “third-party assurance industry” is
becoming increasingly influential in the interpretation of legal norms in a
variety of areas.207 Accountants are thus exercising authority over how
legal norms are valued, interpreted, measured, and verified.208 Given their
203. See Tilt, supra note 200.
204. See Board of Directors, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://tinyurl.com/n4eq328 (last
visited July 24, 2013).
205. DELOITTE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING: THE EMERGING CHALLENGE 2–3 (2010),
available at http://tinyurl.com/m24e8ka.
206. Press Release, Global Reporting Initiative, New GRI Focal Point Helps U.S. Companies
Improve Sustainability (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/nx7or7o.
207. See Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP.
L. 325 (2008).
208. A handful of law firms are beginning to catch up to accounting firms by opening corporate
social responsibility practice groups, but lawyering in this area is still in its early stages. See, e.g.,
Corporate Social Responsibility Practice, FOLEY HOAG LLP, http://tinyurl.com/lq6pkvf (last visited June
24, 2013).
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conflict of interest, sensitive issues may be left out by assurance providers
for fear of upsetting their clients.209 In the case of the GRI where the
verification of data often involves law-related issues such as the application
of international human rights and environmental standards, accountants
arguably lack the professional competence to conduct a proper
evaluation.210 Surprisingly, there are no legal experts on the GRI’s
Technical Advisory Committee, so their participation in the production of
GRI guidelines and the interpretation of indicators is limited to
consultations with Organizational Stakeholders.211

C.

The Distortion of Public Values into Numbers

When indicators do not accurately represent the social phenomena that
they are intended to evaluate, they lose their effectiveness as regulatory
tools. This risk particularly applies to the use of indicators to measure
public values that are non-instrumental and difficult to translate into
numbers. Legal norms may then be interpreted in a managerial way that
distorts their original meaning.212 In the case of the GRI, issues that are
easy to quantify, such as greenhouse gas emissions, are prioritized. At the
same time, issues such as human rights and community impact are
subordinated or even diluted as they are translated into mere business
risks. In this way, indicators may lead to better performance on certain
issues by relying on the power of numbers, but may neglect those issues
that are difficult to quantify. So instead of the maxim “what is measured
gets done,” in fact in reality, what is easy to measure may be the only thing
that gets done.
While quantification may be appropriate for many environmental or
health and safety issues, it is difficult to capture other material information
in measurable quantities. For instance, critics argue that the subjection of
certain issues to cost-benefit analysis (as it is currently structured) may
strip them of their intrinsic value.213 As the GRI develops its fourth

209. See Brendan O’Dwyer & David L. Owen, Assurance Statement Practice in Environmental, Social
and Sustainability Reporting: A Critical Evaluation, 37 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 205, 227 (2005).
210. Giacomo Manetti & Lucia Becatti, Assurance Services for Sustainability Reports: Standards and
Empirical Evidence, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 289, 291 (2009).
211. This is particularly problematic because the GRI needs the support of lawyers before
companies agree to use the guidelines. Corporate counsel must approve before a company discloses
information based on corporate sustainability standards like the GRI.
212. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC.
1589 (2001) (demonstrating that the use of diversity rhetoric in U.S. management transforms and
potentially undermines the legal ideals underlying civil rights law).
213. See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010); Maria Green, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1062 (2001).
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generation of guidelines, there is disagreement over the extent to which
indicators can (or should) be solely based on quantitative data:
The challenge is to what extent can we put the sustainability issues
into measurable figures. Is that possible? Should we move to that
completely or should we also allow for context-related information?
So that’s going to be a big discussion when we start up G4. But
what we’ve seen is that the information that the investors are
looking for are actually these numbers to a large extent.214
The debate over quantification emerged most recently over revision of the
GRI’s human rights indicators.
According to a report by the GRI’s Human Rights Reporting Working
Group, it has been challenging to develop appropriate performance
indicators in this area.215 For instance, one of the human rights indicators
in the G3 guidelines is “total hours of employee training on policies and
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to
operations, including the percentage of employees trained.”216 Yet the
number of employee training hours does not necessarily correlate with
positive human rights outcomes. Another GRI indicator is “total number
of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous people and actions
taken.”217 By exclusively relying on a quantitative measure, this indicator
does not give information about the seriousness of the violations or the
length of time over which they occurred. Good reporting requires more
than just quantitative data:
[I]t is necessary to disaggregate performance data . . . . The report
should pay adequate attention to both narrative and quantitative
data . . . . As a general point, all quantitative indicators have
minimal meaning as isolated pieces of information. Numbers can
indicate how often events have occurred, but will provide little or
no insight into quality (e.g., 100 hours of training does not reflect
whether it was effective or ineffective; 1 million Euros of revenue
does not describe sources of the revenue or their relative
importance to overall strategy). Therefore, all quantitative indicators
must be read in the context of other information and the relative
value of quantitative indicators must be judged in terms of how

214. Interview with representative of the Global Reporting Initiative, in Amsterdam, Neth. (Dec.
8, 2010).
215. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING WORKING
GROUP 7 (2009) (on file with author).
216. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES VERSION
3.0 33 (2000), available at http://tinyurl.com/d75mkwa.
217. Id.
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well it contributes to understanding in combination with the other
required disclosures.218
In other words, public values such as human rights cannot be captured by
numbers alone. Despite the working group’s report, the GRI is moving in
the direction of more quantification and the translation of all issues into
potential financial risks.
As part of its efforts to streamline indicators and mainstream reporting,
the GRI recently announced a goal that by 2020, all companies will adopt
an integrated report.219 This means that a company would release a single
annual report that includes indicators for both financial and non-financial
information.220 The purpose of an integrated report is to raise the status of
non-financial information and demonstrate its relationship to a company’s
core business strategy. Yet if integrated reporting one day became the
norm and ultimately replaced sustainability reports, then the standard for
including environmental and social issues would be financial materiality —
that is, the same standard used for financial statements under the SEC
based on what a reasonable investor would consider important in making
an investment decision.221 Therefore, issues like human rights, which are
materially important for communities and NGOs but may not necessarily
be financially material, may be left out of an integrated report.222
The GRI’s progression towards integrated reporting represents an effort
to translate public values into financial terms and transform them into
business risks. In the case of human rights, what is developing is a risk
management approach that defines potential violations as strategic risks,
which may damage a company’s reputation, threaten its profits, and lead to
possible litigation.223 While risk management has become increasingly
common in public and private governance,224 what are the implications for
it being applied to more value-laden issues such as human rights?
Translating rights into financial risks and indicators may emphasize their
regulatory dimension (including their instrumental, rule-oriented, and
administrative qualities) but disregard their sovereignty dimension (which
218. Id. at 7, 8.
219. See sources cited supra note 111.
220. See ECCLES & KRZUS, supra note 111.
221. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
222. This is the reason why some advocacy organizations do not recommend that integrated
reports completely replace sustainability reports. My discussions with these organizations revealed
that they believe that the audiences for the two reports are different — investors would read the
integrated reports while NGOs and consumers would read sustainability reports.
223. A prominent example of this approach is the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights, which promote human rights risk assessments in the extractive industries sector. Introduction,
VOLUNTARY
PRINCIPLES
ON
SECURITY
&
HUM.
RTS.,
http://voluntaryprinciples.org/principles/introduction (last visited Apr. 11, 2013)
224. See MICHAEL POWER, THE RISK MANAGEMENT OF EVERYTHING: RETHINKING THE
POLITICS OF UNCERTAINTY (2004), available at http://tinyurl.com/l8cbzgq.
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invokes their universal character, symbolic valence, and emancipatory
power).225 As a result, human rights indicators that rely exclusively on
quantitative measurement may distort the legal norms on which they are
based and challenge the usefulness of these tools to effectively evaluate
performance.

IV. HOW TO ENHANCE THE PROMISE AND MINIMIZE THE PERILS OF
INDICATORS
Given the potential costs of using indicators in legal governance, how
can we enhance their effectiveness as regulatory instruments? I argue that
indicators are useful tools that provide important benefits to the
policymaking process. But they are not ends in themselves. Their ultimate
goal should be improving performance and changing long-term behavior.
Towards that end, I draw upon my case study of the GRI to propose the
following recommendations. These prescriptions apply to both regulatory
actors such as government agencies that incorporate indicators into
decision making, as well as private actors such as the GRI that produce
indicators and shape regulation.

A.

Design Meaningful Indicators and Rankings

In order to avoid box ticking and superficial compliance, regulators
should design meaningful indicators that measure information that is
relevant to stakeholders, can be reasonably collected, and addresses issues
on which change is most needed. A meaningful indicator would be one
where an improvement in the number implies that things actually got
better on the ground. Towards that end, it is important to balance
structure-based and process-based indicators with outcome-based
indicators.226 Structure-based indicators focus on the legal and institutional
framework and organizational inputs, such as the adoption of a policy or
equipment type. Process-based indicators measure the efforts made to
meet obligations and achieve performance outcomes, such as levels of
spending on female primary education or the percentage of employees
trained in an organization’s anti-corruption policies. Outcome-oriented
indicators measure how well one’s initiatives are accomplishing the
intended results, such as total greenhouse gas emissions or an increase in
225. See GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF
WORLD BANK (2012); Galit A. Sarfaty, Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The
Marginality of Human Rights at the World Bank, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 647 (2009).
226. I follow here the division of rights-based indicators proposed by Paul Hunt, the former
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health. Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, Interim Report on the Right of Everyone to Enjoy the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health, transmitted by note of the Secretary General, ¶¶ 14–29 U.N. Doc A/58/427 (Oct. 10, 2003).
THE
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literacy rates. These last indicators are the most critical type because they
track progress over time and assess whether or not performance is
improving or worsening. In contrast, process indicators frequently do not
track changes from year to year and do not focus on the extent of
implementation of processes.227
The relevance of the GRI indicators is a primary concern for NGOs,
community groups, and consumers, many of whom are currently not
reading the GRI reports in depth and do not trust the GRI application
levels.228 Until recently, the GRI indicators (particularly those on human
rights) were primarily structure- and process-based. Yet in an effort to
address stakeholders and make their indicators more meaningful, the GRI
has added additional outcome-based indicators.229 For instance, the new
indicators on human rights are: (i) percentage of operations that are
subject to human rights impact assessments; and (ii) number of grievances
related to human rights that were filed and resolved through formal
grievance mechanisms.230 These metrics will measure the degree to which
policies are being implemented and ultimately whether rights are being
progressively realized.
It is also critical to design meaningful rankings that reflect a company’s
quality of performance and its improvement over time, rather than simply
its level of transparency. Not only is the GRI’s grading system only based
on the number of indicators reported by a company, but it also prioritizes
“core” indicators over “additional” ones that may nonetheless be
materially important to stakeholders. For instance, the GRI’s only
indicator on indigenous rights (which measures the total number of
incidents of violations involving the rights of indigenous people and
actions taken) is categorized as “additional.”231 As a result, companies with
an “A” application level do not have to report on an indicator that is
critical for affected communities and certain civil society organizations.
But how does one overcome the difficulties of translating value-laden
issues like human rights into numbers? Measuring human rights is
worthwhile given that it provides a number of benefits: “(1) contextual
description, monitoring, and documentation of violations; (2) classification
of different types of violations; (3) mapping and pattern recognition of
violations over space and time; and (4) secondary analysis that provides
explanations for violations and policy solutions for reducing them in the
227. See Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 45, at 295–96.
228. See supra Part III.A.
229. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI G3 AND G3.1 UPDATE: COMPARISON SHEET,
available at http://tinyurl.com/kbyesmg.
230. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, INDICATORS PROTOCOL SET HUMAN RIGHTS (2011),
available at http://tinyurl.com/mezyyl3.
231. Id.
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future.”232 However, quantitative measurement is insufficient to capture
the full meaning of human rights. Therefore, producers of indicators
should rely on both quantitative data and qualitative information (in
textual or descriptive form) when measuring public values. These methods
are complementary and interdependent ways of understanding a
phenomenon. Quantitative metrics can provide evidence of whether a
violation is widespread or systematic, while qualitative information can
contextualize the problem, establish causal relationships, and clarify why a
situation has arisen.

B.

Avoid Data Overload

When identifying meaningful indicators, one must be careful of data
overload as a result of having too many indicators. Having more data does
not necessarily mean facilitating better decision-making. As I observed
with the GRI, there is a tendency to think that technology is the answer.
Alan Knight, the Associate Senior Partner of AccountAbility (a global
non-profit organization that provides advisory services and creates
standards on sustainability) expressed his concern over the reliance on
technology to produce effective corporate reporting: “Technology is very
good with data. But data must be debated, analyzed, and considered.
Technology can help this process of analysis and consideration but should
not be relied on to provide ready-made answers. Technology is only a tool.
The buck can never stop at a tool.”233 Simply focusing on information
disclosure through indicators may actually be counterproductive because it
may appear as greenwashing. The ultimate goal should be embedding
certain norms into company culture. Telefónica, S.A., a Spanish company
that has effectively used the GRI indicators towards changing behavior
states:
CR [(Corporate responsibility)] reports provide a management
platform similar to an iceberg structure. On top, we have indicators
as the piece of information that is visible in the report. Second, we
have systems and processes implemented in the company, not
visible to stakeholders, that help to produce and collect all
information within the company. And finally, we verify both
indicators and processes to make sure CR issues are implemented
properly. So finally, CR reports are a driver to speed up the CSR
implementation within the company.234
232. Todd Landman, Measuring Human Rights: Principles, Practice, and Policy, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 906,
909 (2004).
233. Alan Knight, Think Different, in THE LANDSCAPE OF INTEGRATED REPORTING:
REFLECTIONS AND NEXT STEPS 38, 38 (Robert G. Eccles et al. eds., 2010).
234. Alberto Andreu, CR and Environmental Director, Telefónica, S.A., Spain, quoted in GLOBAL
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Indicators are just the tip of the iceberg that includes a larger strategy for
change.
The GRI’s focus on disclosing more and more information (resulting in
as many as seventy-nine performance indicators) has led to a deviation
from its goals. The large number of indicators discourages companies
from adopting the GRI, especially U.S. companies whose corporate
counsel fear the litigation risk attached to too much disclosure. On the
part of investors and government officials in the SEC, there is a concern
that GRI reports are not sufficiently streamlined and not focused on
performance outcomes.235 Some regulatory bodies argue that before
mandating any kind of corporate sustainability reporting, they first need a
much smaller set of key performance indicators that are clearly linked with
financial materiality.236 What is currently under debate is which key
performance indicators are the most appropriate for each industry.237

C.

Require Third-Party Verification

Indicators are not meaningful if there is little confidence in the
information that they provide. It must be costly for actors to disclose false
information, which they are arguably more prone to doing under selfmonitoring systems. In order to ensure the quality and reliability of the
data that feeds into indicators, regulatory agencies should require
verification by an independent third party. Possible third parties include
NGOs or auditing firms, as long as they are not directly involved in the
production or governance of the indicators.
The lack of a third-party assurance requirement affects the
trustworthiness of GRI reporting, as viewed by investors and NGOs.
Third-party assurance (where a firm will certify whether a company
conforms to a relevant standard) is currently optional under the G3
guidelines, and there is not a uniform auditing standard that the GRI
requires when an audit is carried out.238 Due to the possibility that
companies may be tempted to misrepresent data so as to enhance their
public reputation, the public and NGOs frequently do not trust the
REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING: HOW VALUABLE IS THE JOURNEY? 27
(2008).
235. See Levy et al., supra note 92, at 105.
236. The GRI is currently responding to these concerns by developing a 4th generation of
guidelines to include more streamlined indicators that will be “standard-ready,” i.e., ready to be
incorporated into future regulations on corporate disclosure. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE,
supra note 110.
237. See STEVE LYDENBERG ET AL., FROM TRANSPARENCY TO PERFORMANCE: INDUSTRYBASED SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING ON KEY ISSUES (2010). See also the work of the
SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.sasb.org/ (last visited July 24,
2013).
238. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 41.
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reports.239 The GRI has been thus far reluctant to require independent
audits, likely because the cost of doing so may dissuade companies from
participating. Thus many private actors rely on self-monitoring regimes
rather than external assurance. In such cases, I recommend an
evolutionary strategy whereby verification would be required only after
there is a critical mass of participants. I argue that the GRI has already
achieved that level and is now suffering from a credibility deficit for not
requiring third-party assurance. Another alternative is to institute a
probabilistic auditing model, whereby companies would contribute to a
GRI-managed fund that would pay for auditing of approximately 10% of
participating companies.240
Independent verification is also critical for indicators that are produced
for, or used by, regulatory agencies. Since agencies have limited resources
to conduct direct oversight, the costs of verification should be spread
among program participants.241 While self-monitoring is cost-effective, the
absence of verification has led to under-compliance in such programs as
Responsible Care and the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).242 In contrast,
such initiatives as the EPA’s Environmental Leadership Program, the
European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, and California’s
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program do rely on third-party verification
entities that are certified by the government.243 Any government program
that incorporates indicators should similarly require assurance because
“[w]ithout verification, self-reporters will become lax, and likely lean
towards underreporting if that is in their self-interest.”244
Assurance providers should follow standardized and transparent criteria
and procedures that are publicly disclosed.245 They should avoid, or at least
disclose, conflicts of interest with the reporting company — for instance,
239. Neil Gunningham, Environmental Management Systems and Community Participation: Rethinking
Chemical Industry Regulation, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 428 (1997–1998).
240. I thank Ian Ayres for this suggestion.
241. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40 ENVTL. L.
1195, 1208 (2010); Eric W. Orts & Paula C. Murray, Environmental Disclosure and Evidentiary Privilege,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 52 (1997).
242. See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 813, 851 (2000) (“It would significantly enhance Responsible Care’s credibility were auditing
independently performed by, or at least subject to, independent verification by third parties.”);
McAllister, supra note 241, at 1209 (noting widespread under-compliance with TRI reporting
requirements as there is no required verification of the accuracy of data).
243. See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1306–07 (1994–1995);
Freeman, supra note 242, at 851; McAllister, supra note 241, at 1228–29.
244. McAllister, supra note 241, at 1210.
245. One of the most prominent standards for auditing of sustainability reports is
AccountAbility’s AA1000 assurance standard, which was developed through a multi-stakeholder
consultation process and is based on the three principles of inclusivity, materiality, and
responsiveness. See ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.accountability.org/standards/index.html (last
visited July 24, 2013).
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an auditing firm should not serve as verifier for a company if it has
designed the company’s CSR policies or processes.246 In addition, the same
firms that provide assurance should not be concurrently involved in the
governance of the indicators, as is currently the case for the GRI. Finally,
governments should regulate the third-party assurance providers through
certification or accreditation, or delegate oversight to an independent
entity.247

D.

Expand Participation by Citizens and a Broad Group of Experts

Given the technical nature of indicators, experts should naturally play a
role in their design and verification. However, there is a risk that they may
exercise undue influence over decision making, exhibit conflicts of interest,
and leave little room for public contestation. The dominance of experts
(especially accounting professionals) can undermine the legitimacy of the
institutions that produce the indicators Ensuring citizen participation in
rulemaking is an important goal in administrative law.248 It is especially
critical in the use of indicators, whose scientific appearance makes them
less open to being challenged by external parties. By broadening public
participation and including a broad group of experts, regulatory entities
can avoid capture by technical experts and the promotion of industry
interests at the expense of public interests.
Private actors and government agencies should expand participation by
the public and NGOs in the design of indicators and engage them in the
reporting process. The GRI exhibits several important mechanisms in this
regard that other actors should adopt — for instance, its multi-stakeholder
consultation process for the design and governance of indicators; its
evolutionary approach that allows periodic review and revision of
indicators by interested parties; and transparency in the methods used to
produce indicators. Yet despite these praiseworthy procedures, the
organization has strayed from its goal of empowering civil society
organizations to make informed decisions and seek greater accountability
for corporate governance. Since it was founded,
[c]onsiderable attention [has been] . . . paid to ensuring collaboration
from major multinational corporations and propounding the
business case for social reporting, while activists and labor [have]
received less attention. These strategic choices and compromises
246. See Penelope Simons, Corporate Voluntarism and Human Rights: The Adequacy and Effectiveness of
Voluntary Self-Regulation Regimes, 1/1/2004 RELATIONSIND. 101, 126–27 (2004).
247. See Gabriela Llobet, “Trust but Verify”: Verification in the Joint Implementation Regime, 31 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 233, 263–64 (1997–1998).
248. For a comprehensive review of the literature on this topic, see Cary Coglianese, Citizen
Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2005–2006).
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[have] shaped the path of the emerging institution, so that the
corporate sector plays an increasingly prominent role, while activists
find themselves somewhat marginalized.249
According to one study, the low readership of GRI reports by civil society
organizations is due to inadequate outreach by the GRI secretariat, the
uneven quality and trustworthiness of reports, and the information that is
too process-oriented to be useful for activist tactics.250 As the latter two
issues have already been addressed above, it is important to address the
need to balance representation among experts and civil society within the
GRI’s governance system. Corporate interests currently exert considerable
influence over the design of indicators and reporting requirements.
Therefore, the GRI should set guidelines to ensure that large businesses
and international consulting and accounting firms do not continue to
dominate the group of Organizational Stakeholders, who vote for
members of the Stakeholder Council and approve nominations for Board
of Directors.251 The challenge will be how to select the most representative
civil society groups to participate in the GRI governance bodies.
In addition to civil society participation, experts from a variety of
disciplines should contribute to the indicator production and verification
processes. In the case of the GRI, accounting professionals have been
overly representative in these processes although they lack the professional
competence to evaluate all types of indicators. Since many of the GRI
indicators draw from legal norms, lawyers should be involved in their
design through representation on the Technical Advisory Committee.
International human rights, labor, and environmental lawyers would not
only provide needed expertise, but they could also facilitate greater
company adoption of GRI guidelines. In the United States, a lack of
support by corporate counsel has been a significant obstacle towards
participation in the GRI by U.S. companies.252 Inside counsel are
frequently hesitant to publicly disclose their companies’ social and
environmental impacts for fear of future litigation.253 Another possible
249. Levy et al., supra note 92, at 91.
250. Brown et al., supra note 193, at 575–76.
251. Levy et al., supra note 92, at 96.
252. Mike Wallace, Director of GRI’s U.S. Focal Point, observed, “I would say it would be very
worthwhile for us to have more legal involvement going forward, because [the obstacle posed by U.S.
corporate counsel] is getting very serious.” Interview with Mike Wallace, U.S. Focal Point, Global
Reporting Initiative, in N.Y.C., NY (Dec. 2, 2010). Interestingly, the obstacles posed by lawyers is
uniquely American as lawyers in Europe are much less concerned about possible risks attached to
non-financial disclosure and have supported the GRI at much higher rates.
253. This is particularly true after a 2003 case, Kasky v. Nike, where Nike was sued for allegedly
deceptive public statements about its labor practices. Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002)
(affirming that the company’s “commercial speech” was entitled to only minimal free speech
protection under the First Amendment). Fearing similar lawsuits, many inside counsel are cautious
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litigation concern involves a company disclosing “material” information in
a voluntary sustainability report that has not been included in a regulatory
filing under federal securities law.254 Since corporate counsel are usually the
ones to decide whether a company will participate in the GRI, lawyers
should be more involved in the GRI in order to appropriately design the
indicators and promote the guidelines to companies. Moreover, assurance
providers should include a broad group of experts in their teams of
verifiers, including not only lawyers but also environmental scientists and
anthropologists with knowledge of the local cultural context.255

CONCLUSION
What are the unintended consequences of using metrics in decision
making? Are indicators measuring what is critical towards changing
behavior? How can we more effectively use these tools to minimize their
costs and enhance their benefits?
In this Article, I have sought to answer these questions by drawing on
an empirical study of the Global Reporting Initiative. I demonstrate that
indicators do not just serve as instruments to regulate behavior; they
themselves have normative authority and may be fraught with problems.
Indicators are playing an important role in governance given their ability to
simplify and translate social phenomena into a numerical representation
that is easy to understand and comparable across actors. They have
become particularly prevalent in international law as a mechanism to
increase compliance and operationalize global norms. Yet as indicators
hide behind a veil of scientific truth and neutrality, they mask potential
problems: the promotion of box-ticking and superficial compliance; the
dominance of technical experts over decision making; and the distortion of
public values into numbers.
Like all tools, indicators can be misused and manipulated in a way that
strays from their purported goals and intended audiences. Their costs
threaten to outweigh their benefits if they are not designed meaningfully
and if there is little confidence in the information that they provide.
Therefore, regulatory bodies should not treat indicators as ends in and of
themselves, but rather as a means towards evaluating performance and
ultimately improving behavior.

about public communications such as sustainability reporting.
254. See Phillip H. Rudolph, By Invitation: Ethical Reporting and the Law, ETHICAL CORP. (Feb. 3,
2005), http://tinyurl.com/mg5vu9v.
255. See Simons, supra note 246, at 127–28.
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